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Implementing Actavis: Three Tips for
Future Courts Assessing Reverse Patent
Settlements Under Rule of Reason
Analysis
Alexander Krueger*
INTRODUCTION
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013), the
Supreme Court took up a hotly contested question: when, if
ever, do reverse patent settlements violate the antitrust laws?
Ultimately, a five-justice majority held that these patent
settlements should be evaluated under a structured version of
the rule of reason that focuses on:
(a) The size of the reverse payment “in relation to the
payor’s anticipated future litigation costs;”
(b) The “independence” of the payment “from other services
for which it might represent payment;” and
(c) The “lack of any other convincing [procompetitive]
justification.”1
This structured rule of reason approach mirrors the proof
my co-author, Einer Elhauge, and I presented in our recent
article on reverse patent settlements.2 Our proof showed that
reverse patent settlements necessarily harm consumer welfare
when:
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1. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (noting that
these factors tend to indicate the likelihood that a reverse payment would
have anticompetitive effects).
2. Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle,
91 TEX. L. REV. 283 (2012).
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(a) The reverse payment exceeds the payor’s anticipated
future litigation costs;3
(b) The size of this reverse payment exceeds the payor’s
anticipated future litigation costs even after subtracting
the value of any goods or services the payor received in
return;4
(c) There
are
no
countervailing
procompetitive
justifications;5 and
(d) The alleged infringer either would not have entered “atrisk” or was not sufficiently judgment-proof.6
In other words, conditions (a)–(c) in the majority’s opinion
are essentially identical to conditions (a)–(c) in our proof. In
particular, the majority specifically focused on the payor’s
anticipated future litigation costs, rather than all of the payor’s
litigation costs (including sunk costs) or the alleged infringer’s
costs.7 Moreover, the majority specifically admonished district
courts not to attempt to “relitigate” the patent merits (i.e., to
try to directly determine the probability that the patent would
have been found valid and infringed),8 and our economic proof
3. Id. at 304 (“[W]hen a reverse payment exceeds the patent holder’s
anticipated litigation costs, a court can be confident that the settlement
exclusion period will exceed he optimal patent reward, while anticompetitively
reducing consumer welfare as compared either to litigation or to an
alternative settlement without a reverse payment of that size.”); id. at 305
(“For the purpose of applying this proof, only the forward-looking anticipated
litigation costs are relevant; past litigation expenses are sunk costs and thus
should not affect the patent holder’s willingness to settle.”).
4. Id. at 305 (“Other times there is also some return consideration, in
which case the reverse payment amount is the difference between the
expected value of the consideration flowing to and from the entrant, leaving
aside the value of setting the entry date and avoiding litigation costs.”).
5. Id. at 309–10 (“Leaving aside cases of judgment-proof entrants, the
proof above shows that when a settlement does nothing else other than set an
entry date and provide reverse payments that exceed the patent holder’s
anticipated litigation costs, then the settlement cannot be justified as
necessary to reach a settlement that: (a) shortens the expected exclusion
period (which would increase ex post consumer welfare); or (b) increases the
patent reward to a level still within the optimal patent exclusion period
(which would increase ex ante consumer welfare). The reason is that our proof
precludes those procompetitive justifications. However, in some cases,
settlements might have unique features that create other procompetitive
justifications that can offset any anticompetitive effects.”).
6. Id. at 307–08.
7. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
8. Id. at 2236–37 (“[A]n antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible
administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed. The Circuit’s holding
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provides a guide to courts and economists for exactly how to
determine whether a particular reverse payment is
anticompetitive without trying to relitigate the patent merits.9
Our economic proof thus provides an easily administrable way
of implementing the majority’s structured rule of reason test
for reverse patent settlements.10
In this piece I focus on the questions Actavis left open to
future courts. In particular, I see at least three tricky questions
future courts will have to answer when implementing the
majority’s structured rule of reason analysis:
A. Are anticompetitive reverse patent settlements
plausible outside of pharmaceutical markets, where
Hatch-Waxman does not apply?
B. What are valid procompetitive efficiencies in reverse
patent settlement cases?
C. What is the most accurate way to estimate the
patentholder’s anticipated future litigation costs?
A. ARE ANTICOMPETITIVE REVERSE PATENT SETTLEMENTS
PLAUSIBLE OUTSIDE OF PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS, WHERE
HATCH-WAXMAN DOES NOT APPLY?
how

The majority spent a large portion of its opinion describing
the Hatch-Waxman Act allows a pharmaceutical

does avoid the need to litigate the patent’s validity (and also, any question of
infringement). But to do so, it throws the baby out with the bath water, and
there is no need to take that drastic step. That is because it is normally not
necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question . . . . In a
word, the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable
surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a
detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”).
9. Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 2, at 304 (“This conclusion does not
rely on any particular level of patent strength . . . or any assumption that the
parties agreed on that level. Nor does it require knowledge of the parties’
varying estimates of patent strength or even knowing which side’s estimate is
greater. It does not even require us to assume that the parties picked the
settlement that maximized profits or to make any particular assumption
about the extent to which the parties considered the risk of antitrust liability.
It simply requires us to assume that neither party to the patent dispute would
agree to a settlement that made it worse off.”).
10. Though the majority did not bring up the possibility that a reverse
payment in excess of the patent-holder’s future litigation costs might not
evince anticompetitive harm when the generic would have entered at-risk and
was significantly judgment-proof, that likely was simply because there was no
allegation in Actavis that any of the settling generics were even plausibly
judgment-proof.
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patentholder and a potentially infringing generic to settle in a
way that guts the incentive of other generics to challenge the
disputed patent.11 This was the majority’s answer to the
defense’s claim that anticompetitive reverse payment schemes
are implausible because “a high reverse payment [would] signal
to other potential challengers that the patentee lacks
confidence in its patent, thereby provoking additional
challenges, perhaps too many for the patentee to ‘buy off[.]’”12 A
future court may therefore wonder whether reverse patent
settlement payments are plausible when the Hatch-Waxman
act does not apply.
Economics shows that the answer is clearly yes. The
relevant economic proof does not hinge on the Hatch-Waxman
Act’s unique generic exclusivity provisions.13 Although the
Hatch-Waxman Act’s generic exclusivity period does provide an
additional entry barrier in the pharmaceutical industry,
anticompetitive reverse payments are plausible in any industry
where some barrier prevents more than a few firms from
challenging the patent.14 The Hatch-Waxman Act provides a
convenient legal barrier, but an anticompetitive reverse
payment scheme would also be plausible in a market where
technological barriers prevented more than one firm from
challenging the patentholder.
For example, Boeing and Airbus are currently each other’s
only competition in the commercial airliner market.15 Further,
it would require any other firm an inordinate amount of time
and resources to enter the commercial airliner market.16 Thus,
if Boeing entered into an anticompetitive reverse payment
settlement with Airbus based on a dubious airliner patent, no
other competitor would plausibly be able to profit from
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227–29, 2235.
Id. at 2235.
Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 2, at 304.
Id.
See DATAMONITOR¸ AIRLINES IN THE UNITED STATES: INDUSTRY
PROFILE 13 (2007) (“The airline industry in the US is characterized by strong
supplier power; a consequence of the global duopoly of Boeing and Airbus that
exists in the manufacture of aircraft globally and the fact that, as yet, no
viable substitute for jet fuel has been discovered.”).
16. Id. at 17 (“Entering the market as a new company requires
considerable capital (for example, to acquire a fleet of planes); and, even for an
existing company to begin operating in the US, the market may impose
significant costs in terms of overheads, wages, and so on.”).
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challenging Boeing’s patent because no other firm would be
able to actually enter the commercial airliner market even if it
won the patent case. Boeing would thus be able to pay off all
potential challengers (here, just Airbus) even though the
Hatch-Waxman Act does not apply to airliner patents.
More generally, our proof showed that any payment in
excess of the patentholder’s anticipated future litigation costs
necessarily implies that the patentholder thought it would be
able to pay off enough of its competitors to anticompetitively
increase its profits.17 There is thus no economic justification for
limiting the antitrust scrutiny of reverse patent settlements to
cases in the pharmaceutical market.
B. WHAT ARE VALID PROCOMPETITIVE EFFICIENCIES IN
REVERSE PATENT SETTLEMENT CASES?
Another vital question the majority left open is exactly
what counts as a valid procompetitive efficiency in reverse
patent settlement cases. The only “redeeming virtues” the
Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged were: (a) saved
litigation costs; and (b) compensation for other services (i.e., the
payment being for a service from the generic, rather than for
delay).18 Given that the relevant size of the reverse payment for
the purposes of comparing it to the patentholder’s future
anticipated litigation costs is the payment minus the value of
any other services in return,19 the majority thus really only
listed one potential procompetitive efficiency: saved litigation
costs. Consequently, courts may ask under what conditions it is

17. Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 2, at 311 (“This same analysis also
rebuts the claim that anticompetitive effects could be eliminated because
nonsettling entrants can still challenge the patent. Even though that
possibility generally exists, our analysis proves that the patent holder would
never make a reverse payment of this size if nonsettling entrants could—
through entry or patent litigation—create the same constraint on its market
power. The patent holder would make a reverse payment that exceeds its
anticipated litigation costs only if excluding the settling entrant confers an
enhanced market power on the patent holder that it otherwise would not
enjoy.” (footnote omitted)).
18. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
19. Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 2, at 305 (“Other times there is also
some return consideration, in which case the reverse payment amount is the
difference between the expected value of the consideration flowing to and from
the entrant, leaving aside the value of setting the entry date and avoiding
litigation costs.”).
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plausible for a given reverse payment to be necessary for
settlement.
When defenders of reverse payments attempt to argue that
reverse payments are necessary for settlement, they usually
rely on the basis that settlement can be difficult when the
patentholder and the generic differed greatly in their estimates
of the patent’s strength.20 In particular, settlement will be more
difficult when the patentholder thinks its patent is stronger
than the generic does (in contrast, if the patentholder thinks its
patent is weaker than the generic does, this difference in
estimated patent strength makes settlement easier, not
harder).21
However, economic analysis shows that reverse payments
in excess of the patentholder’s anticipated future litigation
costs are never necessary to induce procompetitive
settlements.22 A procompetitive patent settlement is one that
does not exclude the generic for any longer than the
probabilistic expected amount of exclusion that would result
from patent litigation.23 But such a settlement is impossible
when the reverse payment exceeds the patentholder’s future
anticipated litigation costs, because such a settlement would
obviously make the patentholder worse off than just continuing
to litigate (it would pay more than it would have in litigation
expenses, but not receive any additional exclusion period).24
Thus, economic analysis shows that it is possible for reverse
payments to procompetitively induce settlement only when the
payment is smaller than the patentholder’s anticipated
litigation costs. In all other cases, the parties either could have
settled without a reverse payment, or the settlement must have
anticompetitively excluded the generic for longer than the
patent strength merited.25

20. See, e.g., Robert D. Willig & John P. Bigelow, Antitrust Policy Toward
Agreements that Settle Patent Litigation, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 655, 660 (2004).
21. Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 2, at 302.
22. Id. at 303.
23. Id. at 296–304.
24. Id. at 299–304.
25. Id. at 303.
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C. WHAT IS THE MOST ACCURATE WAY TO ESTIMATE THE
PATENTHOLDER’S ANTICIPATED LITIGATION COSTS?
A third question explicitly left open by the majority is how
courts should estimate the patentholder’s anticipated future
litigation costs. This can be tricky because future litigation
costs have, by definition, not actually occurred. Worse yet,
defendants have strong incentives to distort their internal
predictions of their future litigation costs in order to protect
their lucrative (but anticompetitive) reverse patent
settlements.26 Reverse payments in future cases will thus
exceed the patentholder’s own internal estimate of its future
anticipated litigation costs only in rare cases where the
patentholder is not aware of the near-automatic antitrust
liability that would result. Consequently, courts will routinely
have to turn to other evidence in order to accurately estimate
the patentholder’s anticipated future litigation costs.
In prior scholarship, I have suggested two alternative
types of evidence that can independently show that the
payment exceeded the patentholder’s anticipated litigation
costs. First, courts could ask whether the reverse payment
exceeds the upper bound of litigation costs from similar cases.27
The economic literature indicates that this threshold is $15
million for pharmaceutical cases, which is still significantly
smaller than any of the reverse payments at issue in past
cases.28 Second, courts could call patent lawyers as expert
witnesses to provide estimates of how expensive it would have
been for the patentholder to litigate.29 Although this would
likely be somewhat expensive, the difficulty of estimating how
much it would cost to litigate a patent case pales in comparison
to the difficulty of actually trying to re-litigate the patent.

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 306.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 305–06.
Id. at 307.
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